With its recent legislation on consumer ADR and ODR, the European
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer satisfaction has now been at the core of EU legal policymaking for more than a decade. With ever more information duties for traders, withdrawal rights for consumers, the policing of standard contract [Vol.29:2 2014] AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT Resolution (ODR), 6 the EU aims to provide a feasible and easily accessible framework within which consumers can pursue their rights quickly and effectively. 7 Through a network of extra-judicial conciliation bodies and an EU online conflict allocation scheme, consumer disputes shall be resolved speedily and in a cost-efficient manner. However, the newly envisaged EU landscape for the resolution of small-stakes B2C disputes has the effect of sidelining state courts. Specifically, conflicts are shifted to private or semiprivate service providers who supposedly follow the consumers' interests by putting efficiency above judicial scrutiny and the observance of due process standards.
This paper argues that this is a detrimental development. The "settlement euphoria" that inspires the European push towards a non-judicial dispute resolution landscape is misguided on both justice and efficiency grounds. It is simply contradictory to set up a sophisticated system of mandatory consumer protection rights and to then leave the "enforcement" of these rights to non-legal private providers, which are not trained or incentivized for this task and which operate outside the procedural safeguards of the court system. To put it differently: mandatory consumer protection rights attempt to correct market failure. Hence, enforcing these rights should not be returned to the market. This move is also inefficient because "false settlement" compromises proper behavioral incentives for businesses. Further, a new and heavily regulated private enforcement architecture alongside the state courts would undoubtedly significantly increase the total transaction costs of the dispute system. Finally, even if ADR decisions are non-binding on the consumer, access to the courts will be at least de facto considerably impaired. Instead, consumer rights should be enforced in streamlined court proceedings specifically designed to meet the requirements 7 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 1; Regulation on Consumer ODR, supra note 6, at 2.
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of B2C disputes arising from small-stakes 8 sales or service contracts in particular. 9 This article starts with describing current developments in the field of consumer behavior, consumer law, and the institutional handling of consumer conflicts (section II). On this basis, the paper discusses fundamental principles of dispute systems design for efficiently enforcing consumer rights (section III) and attempts to develop a coherent model for an efficient consumer rights dispute system regarding small-stakes B2C transactions (section IV). This in turn leads to a critique of the recent EU legislation on consumer ADR and ODR (section V). The final section concludes and summarizes the main results of the paper (section VI).
II. THE CASE FOR CONSUMER RIGHTS DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
Dispute systems design has a long tradition, especially in the United States of America. It deals with adapting the design of a certain conflict resolution procedure to the needs of its users. 10 It tries to do this by establishing rules, principles, or institutions that, taken together, allow a systematic management of a specific type of conflict. By shifting its regulatory focus from the substantive rights of consumers to the procedural framework for handling B2C conflicts, the EU enters the domain of consumer rights dispute systems design. 8 We will assume that small-stakes disputes are cases in which the amount in dispute is lower than E1,000.
9 This is also one of the core recommendations drawn from the so-called Oxford 
A. Recent Developments in Consumer Behavior and Consumer Law
The current European legislation for enforcing consumer rights and resolving B2C disputes follows a somewhat long-term and steady increase in cross-border e-commercell and, consequently, in cross-border consumer disputes. With the rise of the Internet, many consumers have learned to shop online in a sophisticated manner and to exploit differences in price.1 2 They have also gained access to products and services that were previously unavailable to them. Today, for numerous consumers, national borders play only a secondary role in the selection of a contract partner. With growth rates clearly in the double-digit area per year, e-commerce, since the turn of the millennium, is among the fastest growing sectors of the European economy, and there are no signs that this trend might reverse in the foreseeable future--quite the contrary. 13 Coinciding with this development, the EU has taken significant steps to boost consumer confidence even further by setting up a comprehensive and mandatory system of consumer rights in B2C transactions. These include farreaching information duties for businesses, the policing of standard contract terms, rules on product and service quality, remedies for breach of contract, and withdrawal rights. Many of these rights are ineffective, inefficient, and redistribute between consumer segments.1 4 This has not stopped the EU from pushing full force in the direction of ever more consumer protectionliterally at all costs. The current acquis communautaire, the Common Frame of Reference (CFR),1 5 and the Draft Common European Sales Law (DCESL) proposed in 2011,16 reflect the EU's legal policy in this respect over the past two decades. On the level of private international law, Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation has also been designed to ease cross-border trade as it assures the consumer that he will usually be guaranteed, at a minimum, the consumer protection level of his home state. Hence, the consumer can conduct transactions in any Member State without having to be concerned with the respective substantive law.
B. The Current State ofJudicial Consumer Rights Enforcement
However, the concept of boosting cross-border trade and the single European market by mandatory rights of consumers and by (minimum) harmonization of the European Member States' laws in this respect, comes with an important caveat: as second year law students learn all over the world, the value of a right depends heavily on the mode of its enforcement and, in particular, the costs associated with this enforcement. This turns the attention to the question concerning the extent to which consumer rights in small-stakes cases are nowadays effectively enforced in the EU.
Rights enforcement is first and foremost the task of the public courts. Most European Member States allow small-stakes claims to be brought to local courts whose jurisdiction depends on a claim value lower than a certain amount, e.g., 65,000 in Germany.' 7 Furthermore, many Member States do [Vol.29:2 20141 AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT not require parties to be represented by an attorney before such courts. 18 In 2006 and 2007, the EU itself established a European order for payment procedure and a small claims procedure for claims with a value of up to C2,000, which apply to all Member States except Denmark. 19 The goal is to make 'access to justice' a reality even for low-value claims. At the same time, reforms that have made the right to file a claim dependent on a previous unsuccessful settlement attempt or mediation have been repealed in many Member States-sometimes because such . reforms were deemed unconstitutional for limiting parties' access to the courts. 20 Even though Member States have made considerable advances to ease access to their respective small claims courts, the caseload of these courts is steadily decreasing. In Germany, for example, the caseload of the local small claims courts (Amtsgerichte) has declined continuously by more than 2% per
Lower maximum thresholds can be found in Northern Ireland and Scotland (3,000 z C3,500), Ireland (C2,000), and Spain (E900). In the United States, maximum amounts in dispute also vary: for example, California small claims courts handle cases up to $5,000 amount in dispute, while Illinois applies a maximum amount of $10,000. year over the last ten years-despite significant GDP growth rates. 2 1 The situation in other Member States is not different. 22 An explanation for this phenomenon could be that there are fewer and fewer small-stakes contracts or at least fewer and fewer conflicts arising out of these contracts. Both conjectures, however, are highly implausible. It seems much more likely that the transaction costs associated with going to court are prohibitively high for many consumers, and increasingly so: consumers have to spend a three-digit amount in court fees for most claims no matter how low the amount in dispute happens to be. 2 3 Consumers are mostly wary of bringing suit without a lawyer, which generates expensive legal costs, and a significant amount of time is also invested in preparation, i.e., opportunity costs are incurred that will often far exceed the amount in dispute. 24 Hence, using existing state court proceedings to solve these disputes seems to become increasingly inefficient.
The situation is even more problematic for distance transactions in general, and cross-border cases in particular. Here, the geographical distance between at least one party and the competent court, language differences, and a lack of knowledge as to the applicable substantive law pose major obstacles that trigger even higher transactions costs for resolving disputes through the court system. No one, for example, will seriously consider suing a trader located in another Member State 1,000 miles away for a defective Blu-ray player bought over the Internet for E100. It cannot be denied that this negatively impacts on trade and economic growth if no other efficient consumer rights enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms are available. 24 Only about one third of EU customers agree that it is easy to resolve disputes with sellers/providers through the courts. See FLASH EUROBAROMETER 332, supra note 11, at 118. [Vol.29:2 2014] AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
C. The Emergence ofPrivate Competition for Consumer Rights Enforcement
The described deficits of state court proceedings trigger the search for public and private alternatives to the current small claims court system. In the past couple of years, various new forms of dispute resolution proceedings have emerged and have taken a significant market share from the public courts. These proceedings and schemes can be classified in various ways, such as who operates them, who provides funding, what their resolution standard is, what type of decision is issued, and what kind of technology is employed.
Operators
As to the operators of new dispute resolution mechanisms, some are state-run, but most are administered by private providers. There have been some attempts to establish electronic courthouse systems. In 2002, the state of Michigan in the United States, for example, decided to set up a civil cyber court for certain disputes with a claim value over $25,000; however, the project failed to take off and was eventually abandoned ten years later. 25 The Singapore Supreme Court had more staying power. Today, it hosts five socalled Technology Courts-courtrooms that are specially equipped with videoconferencing technology, even though the hearing itself will still take place in the real courtroom. 2 6 However, the payable fees easily exceed $1,000, which makes these courts unattractive for handling small stakes disputes. The first real cyber court still has not been opened, so whatever states have done to modernize their judiciary looks more like a slight update than a real systemic alternative.
In many European Member States, consumer organizations play a significant role in ensuring effective consumer protection. However, the use of innovative dispute resolution schemes is still rare. 27 34 Still in 2012, cybersettle.com advertised having settled more than 200,000 disputes at a total value of $1.6 billion; as of today, they have changed their business model to offering claims management for health care bills. MGMT. 489 (2000) .
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Financing
A second distinct characteristic of the new alternative resolution schemes is their source of funding. Schemes operated by businesses themselves such as the PayPal Resolution Center are usually financed by the company itself. Additionally, dispute resolution tools provided by trading platforms such as eBay Buyer Protection usually do not charge the customer party a procedural fee. If it is a business association, trade chamber, or other interest group that operates the conciliation body, the consumer will usually be charged not more than a nominal fee as a safeguard against abusive claims. For example, most ombudsman schemes are run free of charge and financed by business associations and trade chambers in order to encourage consumers to file their cases using such schemes instead of pursuing claims in a public court. 38 Of course, via the pricing mechanism, the costs for operating the settlement services are borne by the consumers as a group anyway. More specifically, all consumers contribute to financing a resolution scheme that only a subgroup will use. By contrast, with the public court system, it is predominantly those who use it who must pay for it. 39 Hence, even if it is only the public courts that directly charge its users, it is always necessary to consider whether dispute resolution services are worth the associated costs, regardless of who pays for them in the first place. There is no such thing as a free lunch, and this equally applies to consumer dispute resolution.
Resolution Standard
Another analytical heuristic that differentiates consumer dispute resolution schemes is the resolution standard used. From the perspective of dispute systems design, it makes a crucial difference whether conflict resolution aims at enforcing consumer rights, satisfying the parties' interests, enhancing consumer satisfaction, or pursuing any other conceivable aim as a resolution standard. 39 Costs are spread to the general taxpayer only to the extent that court fees (in small claims cases) do not cover the full costs of the proceedings. Further exceptions are cases financed through legal aid. Legal aid grants are not unusual for small claims, but they are predominantly awarded in family disputes rather than in sales law cases. 
AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
Alternative dispute resolution schemes that aim at a consensual dispute settlement frequently place an emphasis on interests, rather than on the positions of the parties or on the rights asserted. 4 0 By contrast, court proceedings, as well as ombudsman services, typically claim to base their decisions on consumer rights on the law. 4 1 It is important to be as clear as possible on this issue. If, next to consumer rights enforcement, consumer satisfaction is stated to be an important goal, 42 evaluating the performance of the provider is possible only if a meaningful way of assessing such satisfaction is suggested, the relevant data collected, and the results published.
Resolution Type
Another crucial factor distinguishing various dispute resolution mechanisms is the type of conflict resolution provided. Whereas state courts mostly encourage settlement but, if the parties do not settle, eventually hand down a binding decision; alternative dispute resolution schemes sometimes also yield a binding decision, e.g., arbitration, but, at other times, do not. This is true, for example, with respect to mediation and collaborative law. In other cases, such alternative schemes result in a hybrid between consensus and third-party decision, such as a semi-binding or preliminary judgment.
The most established example of an entity issuing semi-binding decisions is the ombudsman scheme. Here, the "judgment" is often binding only on the business involved but not on the consumer. For example, German insurance companies subject themselves to the decision of their association ombudsman up to a claim value of C10,000. 4 3 Hence, there seems to be a great option value for consumers in initiating a case with the ombudsman: the procedure is free of charge, and, if they win, the outcome is binding on the counterpart; if they lose, they can still bring suit in a public court. However, consumers in general do not fight an adverse ombudsman decision 40 For the difference between positions, interests, and the method of 'principled negotiation,' see ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 40 passim (2d ed. 1981). 41 before the public courts because of the high costs associated with court proceedings.44 Hence, in general, ombudsman decisions also are at least de facto binding on consumers.
Technology
Finally, alternative dispute resolution schemes can be distinguished on the basis of the technology employed. There exist online tools, offline procedures, and hybrids of both. Examples of online mechanisms are the private dispute resolution providers named above in section 1. Offline systems are used mainly by state or semi-public providers such as the conciliation committees of local chambers of industry and commerce.
It appears that there is a recently emerging trend to switch to online dispute resolution procedures. Sure enough, online providers already surfaced some fifteen years ago, and many of them-such as cybersettle.com-have not maintained their original business model or have even completely disappeared from the market, e.g., Click'n'Settle. However, with companies such as eBay and PayPal providing an innovative, separate dispute resolution system, and with legislators becoming more ready to experiment with modern technology, 45 the online dispute resolution industry seems to be gaining new ground. 4 6 This is not surprising: For small-stakes distance transactions, online resolution clearly is the most efficient form of dispute settlement. 47 44 The major cost driver for parties is the attorneys' fees. Certainly, in most Member States, there is no requirement to hire lawyers in order to file a small claim. However, parties rarely bring suit without a lawyer. This suggests that those who cannot afford or do not want to pay a lawyer do not bring suit and their cases remain untried by a public court. For example, in German small claims courts, the claimant is represented by an attorney in 87% of all cases (cases concluded in 2011). See DESTATIS, supra note 21, at 30. 46 The newly emerging services of modria.com, juripax.com, peopleclaim.com, and justiceonline.com.sg show the recent growth in the industry of dispute resolution providers.
47 Apart from saving transaction costs, one crucial advantage of online dispute resolution procedures is that they avoid the emotion-driven inefficiencies sometimes associated with face to face negotiations. See Joseph B. Walther, Relational Aspects of [Vol.29:2 2014] AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT Moreover, businesses nowadays seem to be quite willing to serve as the sole financier of dispute resolution services and are apparently unafraid of system abuse by consumers. Businesses can obviously live with third-party decisions that are only binding on them but not on consumers. This is because they know that there are enough obstacles the consumer will face before bringing a suit and because they appreciate the enhanced image that results from more consumer satisfaction-whatever that is exactly.
D. Recent Legislation on Consumer Dispute Resolution
Against this background of increasing numbers of distance contracts, systemic deficiencies in the European Member States' small claims procedures, and the rise of alternative forms of dispute resolution, regulators all over the world are attempting to modernize consumer dispute resolution processes.
EU Legislation
As already mentioned, the EU has recently passed a Directive on Consumer ADR and a Regulation on Consumer ODR in order to weave the newly emerging conflict resolution schemes into a comprehensive system of alternative dispute resolution for B2C transactions.
The Directive aims to set up a network of locally available ADR entities to provide fast and low-cost dispute resolution for consumer conflicts arising out of sales and service contracts. 4 8 Traders need not participate, but, as soon as they do, they must provide information on competent ADR entities on their homepage. 4 9 The EU wants every consumer to know about this lowthreshold mechanism. 5 0 At the same time, the Directive is not targeted at taking cases away from the public small claims courts, but at settling cases that now remain unresolved.
5 ' Parallel to the ADR Directive, the Regulation on Consumer ODR enables the EU to set up a Union-wide online platform for consumers, whereby consumers can easily obtain information on a competent ADR entity to handle their case and can immediately file an online complaint. 52 Both regulations, together, aim to build a comprehensive out-of-court consumer dispute resolution framework 5 3 to bridge the gap between direct negotiations between traders and consumers on the one hand, and the public courts on the other.
United States Regulation
While the attempt to establish a cyber court in the state of Michigan was eventually abandoned in 2012, it is relevant to note that it would have only provided a framework for medium and large-stakes disputes. 54 And yet, it might have served as a role model for a low-cost procedure for small claims, too. In any event, it seems unlikely that the technological build-up in US civil procedure will, in the medium term, exceed the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), which permits testimony by videoconferencing under certain circumstances. AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT Dodd-Frank Act laid the foundation for the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in mid-2011, a federal agency responsible for consumer protection in the field of financial products and services. Amongst other services, the CFPB enables consumers to submit an online complaint on any bank-related issue such as money transfers, loans, mortgages, credit cards, or credit reports. 56 The difference between the CFPB complaint and the EU ODR complaint is, however, that the EU service will not be restricted to financial issues and will not handle the complaint itself, but rather simply forward it to a competent ADR entity. A similar service does not exist in the U.S. so far.
Experience from Australia
Apart from the U.S. and the EU, the country with the most significant experience regarding modem public small claims procedures is Australia. The Supreme Court of Victoria and the civil courts in Brisbane have experimented with facilitating court procedures through digital technology. However, the service currently provided is still restricted to comprehensive electronic document management support. 57 Other countries have mimicked this approach and have started electronic case filing at least for the written proceedings.
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For the time being, the efforts of public providers of innovative consumer dispute resolution have thus far been unsystematic. Legislators worldwide strive to make their judiciaries capable of competing with private dispute resolution providers. In order to avoid compromising fundamental due process values of civil procedure-while maintaining systemic coherence-there is a considerable need to define crucial principles of consumer rights dispute systems design for legislators to follow if they create new schemes of procedural consumer protection. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF CONSUMER RIGHTS DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN
To outline principles of consumer rights dispute systems design is a prescriptive rather than a descriptive task. This task does not focus on what new developments in the field of consumer dispute resolution currently look like, but on how dispute systems should be designed and which maxims they should follow. The term 'principles' in this regard means objectives and quality criteria that shape the design of a dispute resolution system and, consequently, its functioning.
A. Justice Criteria
The first fundamental set of principles that consumer rights dispute systems must reflect relates to questions of justice. Here, 'justice' comprises enforcement of substantive consumer rights, respect for established due process values, and access to judicial proceedings.
Consumer Rights Enforcement
It is not a matter of course that the enforcement of substantive consumer rights is or should be one of the guiding principles of consumer dispute resolution procedures. 59 Consumer satisfaction ranks high in current legal policymaking. 60 
AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
Especially in today's ADR world, parties' interests are widely held in higher esteem than their legal positions. 62 This is because interests are perceived to be related to the future, which seems to matter more than succeeding in court, i.e., successfully enforcing a right with respect to an issue relating to or having happened in the past. ADR proponents point out that parties to a conflict want to save time and transaction costs, eliminate litigation risk, and maintain the relationship with their respective counterparts. 6 3 The latter aspect often plays an important role when parties decide to attempt mediation instead of bringing suit. However, the nature of the respective dispute has a considerable impact on the importance of this pro-ADR argument. The preservation of relationships is hardly relevant for consumers and thus, does not push in the direction of alternative dispute resolution in B2C conflicts. As long as they transact on a sufficiently competitive product or services market, consumers can immediately turn to other traders and will have no interest at all in maintaining a sound relationship with their counterparts. This is especially true for distance contracts. Whereas in contracts among locals or within a small industry, parties might not want to burn bridges, a consumer can shop from an almost unlimited number of traders around the world. Thus, she can easily walk away at no cost; it is first and foremost the trader who is interested in a harmonious business-consumer relationship. This is all the more true as the vast majority of consumer disputes arise from alleged malperformance by the trader. 64 In this case, consumer confidence will have already been lost in most cases, and the customer will rarely ever contract with the business again. Hence, as long as the further interests of the consumer-a speedy and low-cost process at little risk-are met, consumer protection will mean enforcing consumer rights rather than reaching a consensus between business and consumer or realizing some other diffuse idea of consumer satisfaction. This argument is supported by research on the social costs and benefits of litigation. Beyond the individual interests of consumers, the social function of enforcing their rights is that only then will those rights be fully honored by businesses. In other words, in case of suboptimal consumer rights enforcement, these rights will be diluted and hence will be the proper incentive for traders to respect them. 65 If a trader anticipates that, should she breach a contract, some alternative dispute resolution scheme will be in place leading to a compromise solution that does not fully compensate the consumer for the harm suffered, breach will occur even if it is inefficient. Hence, consumer dispute resolution systems should aim at full enforcement of substantive consumer rights. 66 Further, the enforcement of rights should be made public to establish precedential value. 67 A financial institution, for example, that violates fiduciary duties towards consumers in selling products to them that earn the institution a commission, 6 8 should be held accountable in all relevant cases. The institution's liability should not be limited to compensating an individual consumer who eventually dared to pursue her rights. 69 An individual enforcement level of significantly less than 100% can be tolerated only if it is compensated by complementary enforcement mechanisms, including, for example, unfair competition suits by competitors or forceful collective redress by consumer organizations.
Consequently, even though it is certainly true that consumers are primarily interested in getting good value for money and not in enforcing the law at all costs, a dispute system for B2C conflicts should, in principle, be 70 Consumer rights, if honored, delineate cases in which consumers do indeed get good value for money. By contrast, alternative dispute resolution procedures for B2C conflicts that are primarily aimed at satisfying the interests of the parties will usually produce compromise solutions that result in a suboptimal enforcement level, benefitting businesses yet harming consumers. Sure enough, the majority of cases brought to small claims courts today also settle or otherwise do not proceed to judgment. 7 ' However, these settlements are usually reached following a clear judicial instruction regarding the merits and risks of the respective cases, thus in the darkest possible shadow of the law. 72 Hence, the outcome of small claims court's proceedings is rights-based regardless of whether a judgment is delivered or not.
A further consequence of this assessment relates to the qualifications of persons that are competent to administer rights-based processes. Clearly, only trained jurists can be entrusted with this job. If the goal of the process is rights enforcement, only legal professionals are in a position to do justice to this goal.
Due Process Values
Apart from the enforcement of substantive consumer rights, several due process values have emerged from the laws of civil procedure of many Member States that are reflected in primary and secondary EU law and thus belong to the "procedural acquis" of the EU. 73 Among these values are the neutrality of any involved third party or dispute resolution provider, adequate competence of such party regarding the respective resolution standard-which might be substantive consumer law-and her accountability. Accountability, here, is understood as referring to the responsibility of the dispute resolution entity for the results achieved and, as the case may be, the reversibility of decisions. If a decision hinges on the interpretation of European law, accountability involves referring a case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This indirectly ensures decision quality and uniform application of consumer law throughout the whole of the European Union.
In addition, accessibility of the relevant procedure is of increasing importance. Dispute resolution mechanisms must be easy to initiate, simple to conduct, available at no or low cost for consumers, etc. If such mechanisms involve large amounts of paperwork, a lengthy procedure drawn out over several months, and a disproportionately high cost to the consumer (e.g., 650 for the enforcement of a C100 claim), chances are high that the consumer will not pursue his claim.
The above-mentioned principles and values might be regarded as rules of law only applying to the judiciary in its traditional sense. However, since handling consumer conflicts along consumer rights will be widely perceived as a public task, it is paramount that legislators obey these due process values regardless of how the concrete dispute system eventually takes shape.
Access to Justice
Apart from the enforcement of consumer rights and due process values, a third fundamental principle of justice in dispute systems design is unconditional access to justice. 74 Especially for typically weak parties, it is essential to have the right to be heard in court 7 5 and not to be deprived of the possibility to bring suit by the law or by a contractual provision agreed to without proper reflection. [Vol.29:2 2014] 
AGAINST FALSE SETTLEMENT
Access to justice is particularly important where businesses are generally allowed to unilaterally propose terms and conditions to the contract in the fine print. Since court proceedings entail unwanted publicity and may lead to disadvantageous precedents from the businesses' perspective, traders might try to exclude legal recourse in their standard business conditions and restrict complaints to alternative dispute resolution. Even though a consumer signs a contract indicating that she has read and accepts the general terms and conditions, it is commonly recognized that this is no meaningful form of consent; nobody truly studies these clauses in advance of signing. Hence, consumers also typically do not wish to waive their right of access to justice because they happen to have signed a contract purporting a waiver of that right. However, if they later find themselves in an alternative dispute resolution procedure, they are prevented from exactly such access, at least for as long as the procedure lasts or as long as they cannot terminate it. 77
B. Efficiency Criteria
Apart from questions of justice, efficiency plays an important role in modern dispute systems design. 78 Efficiency means maximizing social welfare on a cost/benefit basis. 7 9 On the benefits side, fully enforcing consumer rights is, as already discussed, not only a justice issue but also mandated on efficiency grounds. Further, conflict resolution procedures differ in how well they protect a party's reputation, which secures future business. This, however, does not imply that processes and results should be kept confidential. First, as already discussed, protecting one's reputation usually is important only for traders because, other than businesses which are regularly rated in review sites, consumers rarely "carry around" a negative reputation as a contracting party. 80 Second, securing future business is not an end in itself. On efficiency grounds, market participants who generate business only by engaging in dubious or even fraudulent practices should rather be forced to leave the market.
On the costs side, the law generally should reduce transaction costs and thereby facilitate trade. 81 Conflict resolution costs comprise the direct system costs associated with the procedure and its administration and supervision, regardless of whether these are borne by both parties, one of the parties, or a third party, such as the general tax payer (e.g., in case of legal aid awarded to one of the parties). Moreover, there are usually substantial opportunity costs, most notably the time that parties must invest in the process. Procedural efficiency is increased where dispute resolution is not only free of unnecessary cost drivers and redundant complexity, but also fast and reliable. 82 Together with the tenet of a rights-based solution, this provides the background for a coherent model for a consumer rights dispute system in B2C transactions.
80 Even where generating negative customer reputation is feasible, market organizers step back. An interesting example of this phenomenon is the feedback rating on eBay. Since 2008, sellers can only give positive feedback to buyers, whereas buyers can still rate a business negatively. An exception to this asymmetric policy is creditreporting schemes, which allow banks to determine whether a potential customer has a low creditworthiness. 
TRANSACTIONS
Against this background, a sound normative model for a consumer dispute system would be comprised of a low-entry initiation mode, a simple but rights-based resolution procedure, the observance of due process standards, and the quick enforceability of results.
A. Initiation
Initiation of the dispute resolution procedure must be comprehensible to the "average consumer" with modest means and without the assistance of a lawyer. Currently, the best way to realize this is an online standard complaint form that an aggrieved individual can complete on her own by entering her basic data and the reasons for the complaint. The complaint form must not be complex; it is to collect only the most fundamental facts and allegations of the case. It should further involve the capability to upload documents to support the alleged claim.
The value of this kind of complaint form essentially depends on its actual accessibility to the consumers. This fundamentally means that the average consumer should know about the chance to initiate dispute resolution in this way. This in turn presupposes sufficient information, not only from state agencies or consumer organizations, but also from the involved trader himself.
B. Resolution Procedure
The core model procedure of consumer dispute resolution would begin with an asynchronous online exchange between both parties aimed at resolving the issue through plain communication. The trader should be given the possibility to respond to the consumer's argument and to upload relevant documents on his part within ten business days. Still, the complexity of the process should be limited. A well-structured online tool that contrasts the opinions of both parties and accentuates shared views as well as disagreements can help keep the conflict matter manageable. It is debatable whether the model procedure should allow for the taking of evidence. To include such procedural steps means to considerably increase the complexity of the system at the risk of the consumer no longer finding her way through the process. Also, evidentiary issues rarely arise in practice, as most cases can and will be resolved by acknowledgement, waiver, or another form of settlement. On the other hand, excluding questions of proof from the model procedure might provoke abusive consumer complaints with customers opportunistically alleging business malperformance in order to compensate for their own mistakes. A compromise in this regard would be a procedure that does not include evidentiary issues but that allows the case to be referred to a different, more elaborate process if the conflict is escalated to a level on which issues of proof become decisive.
C. Enforcement and Publication
Eventually, the outcome of the dispute resolution should be binding at least on the business and also easily enforceable. Even for small claims, consumers mist be able to mandate a marshal to collect the debt with the full force of the public enforcement machinery, if necessary. Only then does the process give both parties a strong incentive to comply with the procedural outcome.
Apart from that, if the outcome of the dispute resolution scheme is not a settlement but the decision of a third party, it should be published so that other traders and consumers can adjust their behavior to the new precedent. The publication of results is also important because it helps dispute resolution providers arrive at consistent decisions that do not contradict each other. Finally, it also serves to vindicate crucial public policies and principles beyond the private interests of the parties, such as antitrust laws, which are easily violated in non-public settlements.
84
This brief sketch of a model consumer conflict resolution procedure raises the question of where this dispute system should ideally be set up, i.e., who should administer it. Which entity is best equipped to establish a rightsbased, low-cost dispute resolution procedure that observes due process standards and can lead to an easily enforceable and public award? The answer to this question is simple: It is the state. The model described is a modem court proceeding for small claims in B2C disputes. It is the public courts who are in a unique position to enforce consumer rights. Failure in the modernization of civil procedure in many Member States should not lead the legislature to remove public courts' involvement in small claims procedures and to allocate original tasks of the judiciary to private service providers. 85 
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE RECENT EU LEGISLATION ON CONSUMER
ADR AND ODR Against this background, the recent EU legislation on consumer ADR and ODR raises major concerns as to the enforcement of mandatory consumer rights, the compliance with fundamental values of due process, and the efficiency (welfare) effects associated with it.
A. Visions for Viable Consumer Dispute Resolution
The EU model for a Union-wide consumer dispute resolution system is composed of local dispute resolution entities established by the Member States in accordance with the Directive on Consumer ADR and an online clearinghouse set up by the EU itself following the Regulation on Consumer ODR. The underlying vision of this model is to build a new civil justice system not based on courts, but rather, on private or semi-private settlement and decision bodies operated by chambers of commerce, trade associations, consumer organizations, or entirely private service providers. 86 The EU aims to achieve full regional and sector coverage of those services throughout all Member States so that consumers can consistently choose a cheap and accessible alternative to the formalized small claims procedure in public courts. 86 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 64 ("system of redress"); Id. at 68 ("ADR procedures should not be designed to replace court procedures"). See also Regulation on Consumer ODR, supra note 6, at 3. Currently, about half of the existing ADR entities notified to the European Commission are based in Germany. However, German ADR entities are less focused on consumers, and thus, play a less important role than the highly frequented ADR bodies in other countries, e.g., the Financial Ombudsman in the United Kingdom handling alone about one-fifth of about 0.5 million cases per year in the EU; ALLEWELDT ET AL., supra note 42, at 13. 87 Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 66, 71. traders, and regulators, which might in the future even impose an obligation to use the alternative system before bringing suit.
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The EU vision is not the one and only alternative. It is also conceivable, and indeed quite realistic, for there to be massive improvements in the existing small claims court systems in the Member States. Such improvements would, inter alia, result in more efficient court proceedings and the use of modern technology for case filings as well as for the conduct of hearings. Legislators might also consider the use of new public enforcement mechanisms, such as collective redress, punitive damages, consumer advocates, 89 nauseas and similar measures, to make up for individual enforcement deficits. Indeed, the EU now, at least very cautiously, recommends that Member States introduce collective redress schemes. 90 Finally, court modernization could be pushed and supported by innovation in private dispute resolution services. Such services could and should coexist beneficially with the public courts. 9 1
B. Adherence to Fundamental Principles ofProcedural Quality
Whereas the latter vision fully respects and adheres to fundamental principles of procedural quality, the recent EU regulation does so only to a very limited extent.
Justice
Given that consumer justice demands rights-based proceedings, mandatory consumer rights should be enforced by judges or other legal 
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professionals who possess a keen understanding of the law and operate on the basis of fundamental due process principles. In stark contrast, the EU regulation requires natural persons in charge of consumer ADR to only have a general understanding of the law. 92 This is an extremely vague standard. It is also clearly not a qualification that supports the full enforcement of consumer rights. 93 Rather, it aims at raising consumer satisfaction-whatever that means and however it is measured-under the guise of consumer protection.
94
It is also questionable how Member States will effectively monitor the performance and neutrality of dispute resolution providers if they decide or settle disputes according to criteria that have not been transparently established beforehand. 95 Any result may be justified or rationalized as increasing consumer satisfaction. The existing ombudsman entities employ numerous employees whose qualification to handle complicated legal issues is doubtful. Whereas the head ombudsman is often a renowned jurist, 96 there is no transparent mechanism to ensure appropriate staffing. 9 7 Further, enforcing private providers' decisions in contested cases will certainly not be 92 See Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 72. 93 However, Christopher Hodges argues that the "advantage of ADR mechanisms is that they are essentially outside national court systems." Hodges, supra note 59, at 205, 226. This is a distinct disadvantage if the mechanism in question is a rights-based dispute resolution procedure that is administered by non-legal providers. Id.
94 Against the background of the UNCITRAL ODR Project, Ronald Brand argues that access to courts is not access to justice and that only an easily accessible ODR scheme could offer "the hope of real justice." Brand, supra note 52 at 11. Similarly, Julia HOmle sees "greater access to justice" through out-of-court ODR. easier and often will be more difficult than enforcing a small claims court judgment. 98 Finally, the new EU system appears to violate core procedural values such as the right to be heard in court, the possibility to appeal, and the public accountability of decision makers. 99 Whereas the ECJ currently ensures consistent consumer law application throughout the whole EU, referring cases to ADR entities creates significant fragmentation as to the interpretation and application of consumer rights. The consumer dispute system designed by the EU promises effective consumer protection but will yield hardly more than effective consumer sedation.
Efficiency
In terms of procedural efficiency, the EU scheme indeed facilitates complaint filing by making use of modem communication technology. It also aims at offering a fast-track procedure that is simple to initiate and easy to comprehend, even for the average consumer. Moreover, traders who participate in the alternative dispute resolution scheme have to provide information to competent ADR entities so that factual obstacles to the procedure are reduced.
At the same time, the regulatory burden for setting up the EU mechanism is huge. Public authorities in all Member States will have to supervise private ADR providers, their expertise, independence, impartiality, and effectiveness. The EU itself must not only build an online platform for conflict allocation; it must also create an online case management tool for a comprehensive electronic handling of cases. Hence, a new court-like system will emerge next to the small claims courts in every Member State. This will result in an inefficient duplication of resources. It would be much more prudent and efficient to modernize the existing judicial infrastructure in the Member States and provide a court-run, electronic small claims procedure based on the model sketched above.
This rival vision of improving the existing court system builds on the independence and expertise of judges instead of setting up a completely new infrastructure that would be difficult to monitor. It also facilitates 
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competition between state and private proceedings and uses this competition as a discovery process:' 0 0 if private dispute resolution providers come up with innovative (technical) solutions, these elements may later be adopted in the state proceedings. Such competition is, unfortunately, stifled by regulating consumer ADR and ODR in the way the EU currently does.
Access to Justice
A further, but no less pressing, aspect is compliance with the fundamental right of access to justice. Art. 1 of the Directive on Consumer ADR emphasizes that the use of alternative dispute resolution be voluntary for the consumer and should not prevent her from exercising her right of access to the judicial system. Similarly, Art. 10(1) states that Member States:
[S]hall ensure that an agreement between a consumer and a trader to submit complaints to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it was concluded before the dispute has materialized and if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action before the courts for the settlement of the dispute. 0 '
Prima facie, this suggests that consumers cannot be pulled into an ADR procedure in the general terms and conditions of a trader. However, on a closer look, the issue is not that simple. Recital 45 of the ADR Directive makes it quite clear that the wording in Art. 10(1) only relates to ADR procedures that permanently take the case out of the state court system such as arbitration: "In cases where a dispute could not be resolved through a given ADR procedure whose outcome is not binding, the parties should subsequently not be prevented from initiating judicial proceedings in relation to that dispute." 102 In other words, a mediation or conciliation clause in a trader's general terms and conditions would not fall foul of the Directive on Consumer ADR.
Sure enough, the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts includes provisions against unfair small print in consumer contracts. Art. 3(3), Annex (1)(q) suggests that a clause may be regarded as unfair if it excludes or hinders the consumer's right to take legal action. Nevertheless, arbitration clauses are not necessarily invalid because legal 100 The value of competition as a "discovery process" was first highlighted by 101 Directive on Consumer ADR, supra note 6, at 75. 102 Id. at 68.
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action is broadly understood in Annex (1)(q) to mean any procedure that is "covered by legal provisions," and arbitration surely will, in most cases, be covered by such provisions. It is a question of the applicable national consumer protection law whether such a clause is invalid or not. 10 3 Most Member States' laws guard the consumer against unexpected arbitration clauses and deem them void.1 04 Against this background, the new Directive on Consumer ADR does not provide additional protection.
Temporary action waivers such as waivers associated with a mediation or other ADR procedures not binding on the consumer are a different matter, however. In most Member States, these waivers are unobjectionable even if included in the general terms and conditions of a trader. Moreover, they do not violate Annex (1)(q) of Directive 93/13/EEC as consumers maintain the right to bring suit once alternative dispute resolution has failed. 0 5
However, the said waivers are hardly less problematic: they urge consumers to try alternative dispute resolution,1 06 and even though consumers may initiate adversarial proceedings thereafter, they will not pursue such proceedings in most cases. As every mediation practitioner will confirm, it takes a lot of stamina and determination to fight a 50/50 procedures already directly governed by EU law, the EU could set a good example and thereby even free up resources, which the Member States could use to improve the operation of their own small claims courts. The EU also could support and supplement the Member States in their attempts to trim their procedural laws. Such measures can easily be based on Art. 169(2)(b) TFEU.1 20 Member States who today refrain from modernizing their small claims procedures because of lacking resources or legislative lethargy would then be encouraged to follow the lead by the EU and thereby help consumers to effectively pursue their rights.
VI. SUMMARY
With the Directive on Consumer ADR and the Regulation on Consumer ODR, the EU aims to create a new consumer conflict resolution scheme that satisfies the needs of businesses and consumers more effectively than the small claims courts in the Member States currently do. However, from the perspective of dispute systems design, this policy move is highly problematic. The benefit of easy accessibility of the new system comes with severe flaws:
(i) The new system is not geared towards the effective enforcement of consumer rights. However, less than full enforcement compromises the EU's policy of protecting consumers in B2C transactions by mandatory substantive provisions. It also leads to inefficient behavioral incentives for traders.
(ii) The new system also compromises due process values. The right to be heard, the right to appeal a judgment, the right to publicly criticize, the right to discuss the ADR procedure and its outcome, and the accountability of the neutral third party-all these are not necessarily guaranteed.
(iii) The new system establishes a comprehensive, quasi-judicial landscape of ADR providers next to the courts. The private providers must be heavily regulated to secure minimum service standards. The transaction costs associated with this are significant. This duplication of resources-public courts and heavily regulated private ADR providers-is inefficient.
(iv) Finally, the new system will de facto prevent consumers from fighting an ADR decision or opinion even if it is non-binding on them. Hence, it is also highly problematic because it reduces access to justice.
The best institution to realize the goals of a rights-based and efficient consumer dispute resolution system is not a private or semi-private provider but the state. It is simply contradictory to craft a comprehensive set of 
